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THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF 
COAL SURFACE MINING 
By Robert L. Spore'*' 
At the present time, committees in both houses of Congress are 
considering proposed legislation for the control of surface mining, 
particularly surface mining for coal. The degree of concern over 
this problem is suggested not only by the number of published 
accounts of the adverse effects of surface mining/ but also by the 
success of anti-strip mining candidates in recent primary elections. 
That the control of surface mining should now be of national con-
cern comes as no surprise to most persons, for surely the issue is 
consistent with the pattern of rising environmental awareness of 
recent years. 
To the economist, it should come as no surprise that the issue is 
being debated and will no doubt be partially resolved in the ab-
sence of firm quantitative economic assessments of the dimensions 
of the problem. The same pattern of events occurred in the earlier 
controversies over the control of air and water pollution. At most, 
the role of the economist appears to be that of helping to predict 
what the repercussions or impacts of the proposed legislation will 
be on local or regional economies. But the primary issue of whether 
or not scarce resources should be devoted to the control of surface 
mining and, if so, to what extent and by what means or instruments 
of control, seems somehow to escape applied economic analysis. 
This state of affairs often tends to suggest, in turn, that perhaps 
surface mining is not really an "economic" problem, and that cri-
teria for action other than efficiency in the use of scarce resources 
(e.g., that it is "fair" or "equitable" that surface mining be con-
trolled) should be employed in resolving this issue. 
It is the purpose of this article to analyze the economic aspects of 
the problem of surface mining and to discuss the implications of 
that analysis in terms of the economist's conventional recommenda-
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tions for corrective action. Such a review suggests that it has been 
the inability of economists to supply empirical or quantitative 
substance to their theoretical analyses which necessarily has led 
to a discussion and proposed resolution of the issue according to 
other criteria. 
One theoretical aspect of the problem of surface mining is well 
understood by economists and is probably more or less obvious also 
also to others. In general, the problem is one of ex~ernal effects 
or spillovers: the act of surface mining results in environmental 
impacts and costs that are imposed on persons living downstream 
or downslope of the mining site but which are not accounted for 
in market transactions in that those imposing the costs are not 
required to pay for them. For example, downstream persons or 
firms must bear the costs (e.g., increased treatment expenses) asso-
ciated with using water the quality of which has deteriorated due 
to acid drainage or sedimentation.2 As a result, there is a dis-
crepancy between the private and social costs of mining, and mine 
operators, by responding to private costs only, produce too large 
an output at too Iowa price. There occurs not only a misallocation 
or inefficiency in the use of resources-some of the resources de-
voted to mining could have been employed elsewhere to obtain a 
product of higher value-but also a problem of equity, for those 
persons suffering the environmental costs of mining are in fact 
unfairly subsidizing others who are able to enjoy lower prices on 
products produced from the commodity being mined.3 The econ-
omist's suggested remedy in such a situation involves a justified 
intervention of government in the market economy, by corrective 
taxes or mining regulations, so that the external costs are "inter-
nalized" to the mining firm.4 Economic principles can even be em-
ployed to define the preferred extent or degree of mining control 
and mined-area reclamation: society should continue to employ 
resources for the prevention and control of environmental impacts 
only up to the point where the value of the resources so employed 
just equals the value of external costs avoided.5 Implementation of 
this analysis involves primarily the complex and difficult task of 
evaluating (by assigning dollar costs) the environmental or external 
impacts that occur under various degrees of surface mining control. 
It is fair to question, however, whether the situation that would 
result following the introduction of such controls would really be 
acceptable, particularly in the case of coal contour surface mining 
in such mountainous areas as are found in Appalachia. Since many 
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of the areas currently being mined are relatively uninhabited, and 
since the environmental impacts (other than perhaps the destruc-
tion of scenic views) often do not occur more than a few miles 
downstream or downslope, the magnitude of the external costs 
being suffered in the absence of control might not be sufficient to 
justify very extensive or complete mining regulation. 6 On the other 
hand, many persons would feel, at least intuitively, that society 
could devote still more resources to the control of surface mining 
and be better off. Such an intuitive feeling would be correct, for 
there are other aspects to the problem than the control of external 
effects. 
Internalizing external costs amounts to making a correction to 
the market cost of mining some commodity. Presumably, the mar-
ket cost of mining already includes some measure of the time 
stream of returns that could have been obtained from some alterna-
tive use of the land if it had not been mined. That is, the mining 
firm has had to pay some amount for the land it mines, either 
through direct purchase or lease of the site or through a royalty 
payment to the owner of the surface rights. The amount paid repre-
sents the market's evaluation (a discounted present value) of the 
stream of net returns that the land could yield.7 It is necessary, 
however, to examine just what alternative uses and returns the 
market has considered. 
For example, many areas of the Appalachian region underlaid 
by coal seams offer a wide variety of alternative and not mutually 
exclusive benefits to society. Some relatively uninhabited or primi-
tive areas possess rare natural habitats and scenic views of potential 
value for various types of outdoor recreation. Less obviously, such 
areas also have value as pollution sinks and as genetic "banks."8 A 
legitimate question is whether or not the market price of such 
land adequately reflects the value to society of these alternative uses. 
Unfortunately, the answer is that it does not, because of the partic-
ular nature of many of the services that land can provide that are 
"public goods." 
A public good is a good of the type that, once it is supplied to 
one person, it is not possible or desirable to exclude others from 
its enjoyment.9 For example, it is not possible to deny the benefits 
of a genetic "bank" to one person while providing them to others, 
and neither is it possible to assess him fairly for the benefit he gains. 
Up to a point, the additional costs of allowing one more person 
to make use of a recreation area are zero. Since efficiency in the 
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use of resources requires that the price of an additional unit of 
some good or service be set equal to the additional cost of providing 
it, the price to be charged for an additional use of a recreation 
area should be set at zero; thus use should not be rationed by 
positive prices. IO Many members of society would no doubt be 
willing to pay some amount for the preservation of natural habitats 
and scenic views regardless of whether they might ever actually visit 
and enjoy themY But again, since the cost of providing such 
options to an additional person are zero, no price should be charged 
for their provision. 
In all of these cases, where it is impossible to exclude users or 
where the efficient allocation of resources requires the charging 
of zero price, no private person or firm would provide such goods 
and services voluntarily, for it would be unable to gain sufficient 
revenue to cover the cost of provision. Thus, while the preserva-
tion of the land and natural habitats may provide a wide range 
of valuable alterative goods and services, the private market econ-
omy has no incentive to assure their availability. The market price 
of land reflects only the value of those services which a private firm 
can capture.12 The efficient allocation of resources again requires 
the intervention of government, not in this case to internalize 
external costs, but to prevent an unwarranted conversion of natural 
habitats into mining sites. 
Whether private land values accurately reflect social opportunity 
costs must be investigated on a case by case basis. The techniques 
which can be employed are again applications of cost-benefit anal-
ysis; in this instance, they involve explicit comparisons of the 
value of the goods and services flowing from alternative land uses. 13 
If the analysis indicates that preservation of the natural environ-
ment is justified, then such preservation should be provided for 
through the public. budget and paid for out of general revenues.14 
It is important to realize the considerable difficulties involved 
when attempting to implement this decision-making framework. 
In particular, it is exceedingly difficult to evaluate the benefits that 
would accrue to society from the provision of a genetic "bank" or 
from the use (or option to use) a wilderness recreation area.15 The 
desired measure of benefit is the individual's willingness to pay, 
but since no markets exist where such goods and services can be 
exchanged at equilibrium prices, methods other than the use of 
market prices for imputing benefits must be devised. Procedures 
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must be found not only for estimating the demand for such goods 
and services but also for determining the appropriate dollar bene-
fits that would be obtained from their provision. Although con-
siderable progress has recently been made in the case of outdoor 
recreation,16 much needed research remains. While in times past 
economists can perhaps be justifiably accused of having ignored 
this area of applied analysis, much of the lack of progress and devel-
opment is directly related to the intractable nature of the problem. 
Meanwhile, environmental awareness has continued to grow and 
demands for solutions to these problems have increased. Thus, it 
has been necessary to debate the issues and propose legislative solu-
tions in the absence of the valuable cost-benefit information the 
economist might provide. Of necessity, then, criteria other than the 
efficient use of scarce resources have been applied to the problem. 
In this study, it is important to consider the implications of resolv-
ing these problems according to these other criteria. 
Currently, much of the discussion concerning coal surface mining 
involves not whether some control might be justified, but rather 
what the resulting economic repercussions on employment, income, 
and regional economic development would be if surface mining 
were so strictly controlled as to make it unprofitable. This is also 
an economic problem, but one of income distribution or equity 
rather than resource allocation. Interestingly, concern over the 
possible adverse employment effects of the control of surface min-
ing continues despite the fact that reclamation programs would 
require the use of additional labor and that, where surface mining 
is eliminated, the effect of a shift to deep mining would be an 
increase in total regional employmentP Thus, only in those areas 
where surface mining would be eliminated and deep mining would 
not be a feasible production alternative is concern over employ-
ment justified. In such areas, surface mining is presently pro-
viding employment while, on the other hand, preserving natural 
habitats and related public goods and services often are not types 
of economic activities which result in immediate local employment 
and economic development in the traditional sense of the word. 
Such is not necessarily the case in the long run, however. For 
example, the Appalachian Regional Commission has spent huge 
sums on the construction of highways designed to link the Appa-
lachian states more closely to national markets and to remove the 
transportation handicap of the past. Since a major feature of several 
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of these states is their wilderness appeal, various types of amenity-
oriented economic activities will be attracted once these highways 
are completed. Continued surface mining will almost certainly 
prevent this development.1s 
It is important to recognize that it is not necessary to sacrifice the 
preservation of natural habitats and efficiency in resource alloca-
tion in the interest of providing a fair or just distribution of in-
come. The two goals need not be at odds. If inequity in income 
distribution is the problem at hand-and surely it is in the de-
pressed regions of Appalachia-then there are preferable means of 
meeting this problem. Employment dislocations can be met more 
effectively and efficiently through such devices as job re-training, 
improved educational systems, and the like.19 Public funds are 
required for programs to solve this problem. We need not also 
sacrifice our natural environment and the irreplaceable services 
it can provide. 
Another element entering the discussion is the possible effect on 
the energy supply if surface mining is too strictly controlled or 
eliminated. While the issues surrounding the current energy 
"crisis" are complex, objectivity is required to put this particular 
aspect into perspective. Thus, the forecasts by mine operators and 
electric utilities of widespread fuel shortages if mountain surface 
mining were eliminated should be compared with the fact that of 
all fuels burned in the U.S. for electric power generation, only 
eleven percent comes from contour stripped coal, and much of this 
could easily be absorbed by increased deep mining.20 Any resulting 
increase in coal prices will be paid by coal users, which is desirable 
in the interests of both resource allocation and equity. 
In conclusion, while several issues cloud the discussion of surface 
mining, the basic problem is one of efficiency in the use of scarce 
resources. Since the private market fails to take into account the 
external costs of surface mining and the full opportunity costs of 
land use, scarce resources are currently not being used efficiently; 
therefore, governmental intervention to promote surface mining 
regulation and mined-area reclamation is justified. While eco-
nomic analysis can provide important guidelines to aid government 
decision-making, much necessary research, particularly in the area 
of the valuation of public goods, must first be performed. Without 
this research, any surface mining controls that are implemented 
will be in accordance with other criteria, with no guarantee that 
the social welfare will in fact be improved. 
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